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WHAT IS AND WH1AT IS NOT
UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION BY COMON CARRIERS.
Chapter I.
A common carrier is said to be "any man undertaking
for hire to carry the goods of all persons indifferently"
Gisbourn v Hurst I Salk. 249. Huthhinson on Carriers,
sec. 47, defines a co:non carrier to be"one who under-
takes as a busiress, for hire, to carry from one place to
another the goods of all persons who may apply for such
carriage, provided the goods be or the kind which he pro-
fesses to carry, and the person so applying will agree to
have them carried upon the lawful terms prescribed by the
carrier; and who, if he refuses to carry such goods for
those who are willing to comply with his terms becomes
liable to an action by the aggrieved party for such re-
fusal."
The duty of a common carrier then; is to serve the
public; he is a quasi public agent; can treat no one in-
dividual or corporation in such a way as to prevent him
from treating all individuals or corporations in a like
way, providing each and al! agree to the lawful termis
made by him.
Appleton C.J. said in the case of' the New Ehgland
Express Co. v. Maine Central Railroad, 57 Maine 188,
"Common carriers are bound to carry indifferently, with-
in the usual range of their business, for a reasdnable
considdration all freight offered and all passengers who
apply. For similar equal services they are entitled to
the same compensation. All applying have arL equal right
to be transported or to have their freight transported,
in the order of their applicqtion. They can riot legally
give undue and unjust preferences, nor make unequal azd
extravagant charges. Having the means of transportation
they are liable to an action if they refuse to carry
freight or passengers without just grounds for such re-
fusal." "The very definition of a common carrier ex-
cludes the right to krant monopolies or to give special
or unequal preferences, it implies indifference as to
whom they may serve, and an equal readiness to serve all
who may apply, and in the order of their application."
In cornection with this brief suggestion as to Yh.at
the duties of a common carrier are it might be well to
observe the legislation on the subject both in this coun-
try and in England. Prior to 1854 preferences were giv-
en to certain individuals as to the time of' forwarding
their goods by railroad companies in England. But this
practice becaie a grievance there and was stopped by the
Railroad and Canal Traffic Act in 1854.
The principal section of that act prohibited such
companies from making or giving any undue or unreasonable
preference or advantage to or in favor of any particular
person or company or any particular description of traf-
fic in any respect whatever,;with a further provision for
a summary proceeding betore the Court or Common Pleas or
any of its judges by motion or sumrmons to restrain such
companies from the violation of this provision of the
act and to compel the compliance with it by writ of at-
tachment.
The question has also been made the subject of nuch
statutory regulation in the United States; it is called
the Interstate Conmerce Act passed by the Congress of the
United States and approved Febru-ry 4, 1887. Chapter
104, sec. 1, provides, "all charges for any service ren-
dered in the transportation of passengers or property as
aforesaid, or in connection therewith, or for the receiv-
ing, delivering, storage, or handling of' such property,
shall be reasonable and just; and every unjust and un-
reasonable charge for such service is prohibited and de-
clared to be unlawful."
Section 2, "that if any common carrier subject to t, he
provisions of this act shall, directly or indirectly, by
any special rate, rebate, or drawback or other device,
charge, demand, collect or receive from any person or
persons a greater or less compensation for any service
rendered or to be rendered in the transportatilon of' pas-
sengers or property, subject to the provisions of' this
act, than it charges, demands, collects or receives, from
any other person or persons for doing for him or them a
like and contemporaneous service in the transportation of
a like kind of' traffic under substantially similar cir-
cumstances and conditions, such common carrier shall be
guilty of unjust discrimination, which is hereby prohib-
ited and declared to be unlawfUl."
Section 3, "that it shall be unlawful for aniy cormnon car-
rier subject to the provisions of this act to make or
give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to
any particular person, company, firm or locality; or any
particular description of' traffic, in any respect whatso-
ever, or ot subject any particular person, company, firm,
corporation, or locality or any particular description of
traffic, to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or dis-
advantage in any respect whatsoever."
The Interstate Com-nerce Act does not apply to the
transportation of passengers or property wholkywithin one
state nor to passengers or property shipped to or from a
foreign country from or to any state or territory.
For this reason most of the states have legislated
upon the question and it is of the same general character
asthe Interstate Oommerce Act in all the states v~ich
have thus far acted. It is safe to say that in all of
the states it is well settled that it is within the power
of the state legislatures to prevent unjust and unreason-
6able discrimination by the carriers operating within the
state. Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. People, 121 Ill
304. QI~cago etc. R.R. Co. v. People, 67 Ill. II.
State v. Railroad Co., 22 Neb. 313. Gulf etc. R.R. Co.
v. Dwyer, 75 Texas 572.
Chapter II.
What is Unlawful Discrimination.
Discrimination is the legal term now used to des-
cribe a breach of the carrier's common law or statutory
duty to treat all customers alike. The term is technic-
ally applied to freight charges. And when there is a
discriminatio, between consignors it is more properly
called a preference or advantage.
In treating the subject of' what is unlawful discrim-
ination I will , therefore, divide it into two classes,
first, as to consignors or persons, second as to rates
charged different shippers.
In England the Canal Traffic Act has regulated pref-
erences given consignors by carriers.
The principal examples of the English decisions of
undue pr6ferences are as follow:
In Baxendale v. Bristol etc. R.R. Co., 11 Common Bench
"N.S." 787 it was held where a railroadcompany permitted
a carrier, who acted as superintendent of the gm)ds'
traffic to hold himself out as their agent for the re-
ceipt of goods to be carried on their line, and his of-
fice as the receiving office of the company, and goods
were received by him at that place without requiring the
sender to sign conditions which the company required all
other carriers who brought goods to their station to sign
that amountt'to undue preference.
In Garton v. Bristol etc. R.R. Co. 30 Law Journal,
Queens Bench, 273, it was held where a company closed
their offices at a certain hour and refused to receive
goods tenderedto them after with the proper amount of
carriage, while at the same time they continued to re-
ceive goods of the same class, prepared in the same man-
ner, from a particular individual, that this amounted to
undue preference.
In Palmer v. London etc, R.R. 40 Law Journal Common
Pleas, 133, it was held where a company admitted into
their stations their own vans, with goods to be forwarded
that night at a later hour than they admitted those of
other persons, that this amounted to undue preference.
In Diphways v. the F.R. Co. Railroad cases 2 N.and M.
73. A railroad company with the object of' discouraging
the construction of' a competing line carried slate for
certain quarry owners who agreed to send all their slate
over the railroad company's line for a fixed number of
years at a less rate than they charged for the same ser-
vice to the complairnant,quarry owners, who were offered,
but refused to bind themselves by such an agreement.
Held, that this was an undue preference within the mean-
ing of the anal Traffic Act. See other cases there
cited.
This decision was not followed by the New York court
in the case of Lough v. Outerbridge, 143 N.Y. 271 which
I will take up at more length in Chapter III.
In the United States the most i12ortant decisions
are as follows: In the 1Tew England Express Company v.
the Maine Central R.R., 108.The railroad company had en-
tered into a contract with one expresscompany, to give to
it for a period of years certain exclusive accomodations
and privileges in the passanger trains of the road for
carrying of express freight, which it had subsequently
denied to the plaintiff, another express co.rpany, upon
its application for the same privileges. Upon being de-
nied the rights asked for, plaintiff seeks redress. Held
that there wts an undue preference and the company were
liable to plaintiff. See cases cited and also Interna-
tional Express Co. v. Ryle, 81 Me. 92.
In Mchiffee v. the P. & R. R.R. 52 N.H. 430, it was
held that a railroad company must f1urnish all parties
similar accomodation and can show no preferences. There
are other cases in the various states holding practically
the same as those above, but to which I would only refer
by the way of citations.
Sanford v. R.R. Co., 24 Pa. St. 378.
7 Vroom (New Jersey) 407. Messenger v. Pa. R.R.
Great Western R.R. Co. v. Burns, 60 11. 284.
Kenney v. R.R., 47 N.Y. 525.
Wibert v. R.R., 12 N.Y. 245.
Chicago R.R. v. People, 56 Il. 355.
C. & A. R.R. v. People, 67 Ill. 11.
Chicago R.R. v. Sullen,21 North EasteruReporter 824.
And cases there cited.
Second Class: As to rates charged different ship-
pers.
Discririination in freight traffics by railroad com-
panies means to charge shippers unequal sums for carry-
ing the samie quantity of goods equal distances.
Hines v. R.R. Co. 95 N.C. 434. And in that case the
court said; that if A shi1.ped ten, and B five, bales of
cotton, A must for five of his ten be charged the same as
B , and as to his remaining bales, a like rate to main-
tain equality.
In each particular casethere shall be charged a
reasonable compensation and no more.
Root v. R.R. Co., 114 N.Y. 300.
The question of what is reasonable depends upon the
circumstances of eafah particular case, and this ordinari-
ly is a question of facts for the jury. Root v. R.R. Co
114 N.Y. 300.
A reasoiable compensation in each case does not
however, necessarily mean absolute uniformity of rates
in all cases.
Cleveland etc. R.R. Co. v. Cosser, 126 Ind. 384.
Scofield v. R.R. Co., 43 Ohio State 571.
It is obvious that whether the common carrier acts
impartially or riot depends, upon the circumstances of
each particular case, for regard mst be had to such cir-
cumstances as quantity, distance, and kindred cor,,sidera-
tions. The hinge of the question is not found in the
single fa ct of discrimination, for disorimination with-
out partiality is inoffensive, and partiality exists only
in cases where advantages are equal, and one party is urn-
duly favored at the expense of another who stands upon
equal footing. Cormnercial agents have free power of
making contracts essential for the purpose of iaking com-
mercial profit. Railway companies have that power as
free as any merchants, subject only to the duty of acting
impartially with respect to persons, and this duty is
performed when the offlr to contract is made to all who
wish to adopt it. Large contracts may be beyond the
means of small capitalists, contracts for long distances
may be beyond the needs of some whose traffic is confined
to a home district; but the power of the railroad com-
pany to contract is not restricted by these considera-
tions. Sol think, by the English and American cases
cited the conclusion is reached, that mere inequality in
charges does not amount to an unjust discrimination, and
that to make a contract void because of unjust discrimi-
nation, there must be a discrimination in the rates
charged for transportation of the goods of the same class,
of different shippers, under like circumstarces and con-
ditions.
Nicholso v. R.R. Co., 5 C.B. (N.S.) 366.
R.R. Co. v. Sutton, Law Reports 4 H.L. 238.
R.R. Co. v. Gage, 12 Gray (Mass.) 393.
Killiner v. R.R. Co., 100 N.Y. 395.
Messenger v. R.R. Co., 36 N.J. Law 407, and cases cited.
A discrimination made merely upon the amount of
freight furnished and which results in giving to the larg
shipper an advantage over the smaller is not reasonable.
Hayes v. Penna. Co., 12 Fed. Rep. 309.
Kingsley v. R.R. Co., 37 Fed. Rep. 181.
Neither is a discrimination having practically the
same results giving to a shipper transporting oil, in
his owri car, a preference in rates over one who ships in
barrel.
State v. R.R. Co., 47 Ohio St. 130.
A certain rebate allowed to certain shippers is an
unjust discrimination against others shipping like goods
under the sume circumstances.
Cook v. R.R. 46 No. West. Rep. 1080.
A contnon carrier may contract to ship goods at a
lower rate than the established tariff; but he cannot
contract to deny the same reduced rate to other shippers.
Christie v. Missouri R.R. Co., 32 Am. and Eng. R.R. Cases
413.
It is an unsettled question whether a carrier is
guilty of discrimination who fol&ows the system of allow-
ing raw goods to be transported to the place of manufac-
ture, and thence beyond after manufacture, at the same
rate of freight charged for goods carried without stop.
In the case of In Re Iowa Barb Steel Wire Co., 1
Interstate Coimerce Rep. 17 a petition was presented by a
manufacturing corporation which recited in substance that
railroad companies had bennaccustomed to permit it as it
did other like manufactures to procure its raw material
at a distance, manufacture its goods therefrom and then
ship the goods to a market at the same aggregate rate for
transportation of both raw material and manufactured
goods as would be charged had there been no stoppage in
transit, and no manufacture, that this privilege of* manu-
facturing in transit was valuable to the corporation arid
to the coimmunity in which its business was located, and
wronged no one; and petitioner prayed that it might be
sanctiored by the commission. But no authority to that
effect having been oonferred upon the commission the pe-
tition vas dismissed.
A contract for discrimination can not be upheld sim-
ply because the favored shipper may furnish for shipment
during the year a larger quantity of goods in the aggre-
gate than any other shipper, or more than all otl*rs com-
bined. While the carrier's interests are to receive
some regard; yet a discrimination contract will not be
upheld simply because it is largely profitable to the
carrier. A discrimination is not justified by an agree-
ment with the favored shipper to give all the traffic to
the railroad, and not to divert it to other routes, there
being no agreement to send any definite quantity in any
specified time; nor to prevent threatened competition
where none exists. A railroad company can not support a
discount, based or. the quartity of freight received by
arty one shipper on theprinciples which ard applied among
merchants whereby they give better prices in wholesale
than in retail dealing. The cases are riot at all analo-
gous. In Providence Coal Co. v. P.M.W. R.R. Co., 1 In-
terstate Commerce Rep. 107, Cooley said; "Quantity, mere-
ly as quantity indicated nothing as to the relative cost
of carriage. Of' course, the carrier saves sonething in
cost and in labor by having the coal carried by it re-
ceived in large quantities by single consignees. Wd
admit that its service for large dealers is somewhat le,-s
in proportion to the quantity of freight transported than
is the like service performed for small dealers. We
also admit that the carrier may therefore seem to have an
interest in restricting its dealings so far as possible
to large dealers. But this is an interest that can only
be consulted and acted upon in strict subordination to
the rules of law; and one of the most important of' those
rules is that, in any discrimination between dealers,
justice, if not a paramount consideration shall at least
be kept in view. The carrier can not regard 7is own in-
terests exclusively; if it could it might at pleasure by
methods easily available, drive all small dealers off its
line and center the whole trade in a few hands. The
state of. things that would result might be altogether for
its interest and convenience, since it would then have
fev-er customers to deal with aild fewer transactions for
the same aggregate trade; but the wrong would be fla-
grant."
In taking up the cases that decide what is unlawful
discrimination I have not referred to all of the cases
reported, but have taken them only in a br6ef way; and
while I think I have touched upon nearly every case that
takes up a different branch of unlawful discrimination
infreight and as to consignors, I have left the cases
cited, in the reports to which I have referred in this
chapter for the reader to look up, as it saves space, and
is but little trouble for hi., since I have found the
one case in each instance where they are collected.
Chapter III.
What is not Unlawful Discrimination.
In determining this question it would be extremely
difficult to lay down any fixed and fast defini~ion or
rules that would cover every case that might arise, so I
propose to take up those cases in which it has been held
that certain discriminations are not enlawful. In so
doing I shall divide the subject as in chapter II into
two classes, first as to consignors or shippers, second,
as to rates charged different shippers.
In 1885 a number of cases came to the Supreme Court
of the United States 6n appeal from the Circuit Court.
They are known as the Express Cases and are reported in
117 U.S. 1.
Certain express companies had entered into an agree-
ment with the defendant railways whereby the railroad
companies agreed to carry all the express busine~s of the
plaintiff, express companies, up to a certain number of
pounds each day for a certain price per day, the contract§
were to run a year and if' not deter-Aned upon thirty days
notice by either party, to continue for another year, and
so on. The railroad company had decided to conduct an
express business on its own account, gave the plaintiffs
thirty days notice, and offered to carry their express
business for reasonable rates. Whereupon the plaintiffs
bring this action for temporary injunction compelling the
company to receive their express until a permanent in-
junction could be obtained. Having succeeded in the
lower court the defendant appeals to this court.
The exact question in the case then, is whether
these express companies can now demand as a right what
they have heretofore had onlt as a permission. That
depends on, whether all railroad companies are now by
law charged with the duty of carrying all express compa-
nies, in the way that express carriers when taken are
usually carried, just as they are with the duty of carry-
ing all passengers and freights when offered in the way
that passengers and freights are carried.
Since the Constitution and the state laws do riot
require any railroad company to carry all the express
companies in the way,that, under some circumstances they
may be able without inconvenience to carry one company.
And as there is no usage which demands that all express
companies shall be carried on any railroad to which it
may apply, unless specially contracted for. And as the
public are amply provided with express facilities by the
railroad itself, it is truly hard to see how courts have
ar right to make contracts for express companies which
it was their business to make for themselves. if the
public actually demand that for their interests it is
best that all railroads should carry any and all express
companies who may apply for carriage then it is in the
province of the legislature and Congress to give the rem-
edy.
But of' course there is a chance for argument and
sych learned judges as Miller and Field who dissented to
the prevailing opinion in these cases thought that it was
necessary for railroads to carry all express companies, a
as in so doing it would best provide the public with pro-
per express carriage; and that the courts could determine
as in Wiantum Merit what was reasonable charges by rail-
road companies in case of' disagreements between the ex-
press companies and the railroad.
Aside from the cases just decided the very important
case of Lough V. Outerbridge, 143 N.Y. 271 is about the
only other case of' importance along this line in the U-
nited States. In that case the deferdan~t was engaged in
business as a common carrier transporting freight between
New York and ceytain islands, among them Barbados. Its
stesaers sailed frm New York at intervals of about ten
days. Another steamer, which was engaged in the South
American trade, and sailed from New York at intervals of
about six weeks, took freight for Barbados when it had
any space left after taking on freight which was to be
carried to South America. Said companies'regular rates
were fifty cents a dry barrel. It and the other defend-
ants, its agents, offered special reduced rates of twen-
ty-five cents per dry barrel to all merchants and busi-
ness men in New York, who would agree to ship by their
line exclusivelyoduring the wee4 said outside steamer was
there engaged in obtaining freight, and taking on cargo.
Plaintiff's firm who were shipping by that stemaer, de-
manded of defendants that they receive certain barrels of
freight and transport the same from New York to Barbados
at the special rate of twenty-five cents. This defend-
ant offered to do if said firm would agree to give their
shipments for that week exclusively to their line, aid
also offered to carry plaintiff's freight at all times
without conditions for forty cents. This offer the firm
declindd, and defendant refused to receive the freight.
The same rates, terms and conditions, were offered all
shippers. In an action to compel the defendants to re-
ceive and transport the plaintiff's freight at the sped-
ial reduced rates, without conditions, the court found
that the rate of forty cents was a reasonable one, and th
reduced rate of twenty-five cents was not profitable.
This was a very important case as it touched commerc
and more especially the duties and obligations of common
carriers to the public, at many points. The learned
counsel for the plaintiffs made a desperate and Sallant
fight to get the decision of the @erieral Term, which va-
cated the order in telling the defendants to carry their
freight reversed. At the argument before the Court of
Appeals only five judges were present, namely, O'Brien,
Finch, Gray, Bartlett, and Peckham. Finch, Gray and
Bartlett concurred with O'Brien in his opinion, but Peck-
ham dissented. The counsel made a motion for a reheqr-
ing before a full court and it was granted. But upon a
rearguent the former decision was allowed to stand, but
Peckham dissented and Chief Judge Andrews who was absent
at #he former argu ment was inclined to hold with Peck-
ham.
The princip;-.l point in the argument of plaintiff,
aside from the prevailing point that the whole transac-
tion was an unlawful discrimination, was that, the condl!-
tion imposed that the reduced rate should be granted on-
ly to such merchants as stipulated to give their entire
business, while interms imposed upon the public generally
was in fact aimed at the plaintiffs alone. The evidence
on this point was disputed; but assuming that such was
the case how could it affect the result ? The counsel
argued that it cwriclusively showed the purpose of the de-
fendants to coqpel the plaintiffs to withdraw their patro
nage from the other line, to suppress competitionin the
business, and to retain a monopoly for their own benep
fit. While it did tend to dn all this, what unlawful
element was there about it ? If I, being a merchart,
wish to drive my next door neighbor out of the same kind
of business, and by trying to do it, I offer special in.
ducements to customers who will deal exclusively with me;
in other words I undersell my neighbor, and at a loss to
myself. The public are riot injured by reason of, this.
If my neighbor wishes to stay in the business let him
drop down to my prices. If he cannot afford to do that
let him do the next best thing. I have done nothing un-
lawtul so long as I treat all customers alike. So in
this case, the mere fact that the defendants would be the
only transporters between the two points in question
would not create what is commonly called a monopoly,
where only one person or corporation has control of the
whole business of a certain kind in the community. For
the reason that the torty cent rate is reasonable and no
company could at'bord to carry any less than that, and the
defendants agreed to carry for that and could not ask any
more.
In Mogul Steamship Co. v- McGregor, Law Rep. 21
Queens Bench div. 545, Lord Coleridge said: "The defend-
ants are traders with enormous sums of money embarked
in their adventure, and naturally and allowably desire
to reap a profit from their trade. They have a right to
push their lawful trades by all law±'l1 means. They
have a right to endeavor, by lawful means, to keep their
trale in their own hands, and by the same means to ex-
clude others from its benefits, if they can. Amongst
lawful means is certainly included the inducing by prof-
itable offers customers to deal with them rather than
with their rivals. It follows that they may if they see
fit endeavor to induce customers to deal with them exclu-
sively by giving notice that only to exclusive customers
will they give the advantage of their profitable offers."
The plaintiff's rely on the case of Menach v. Ward,
27 Fed. Rep. 529, but it is distinguished from this case,
the facts being entirely different. In that case the
court recognized the same general principles in regard to
the duties of' common carriers as is expressed in the case
under discussion. It said: "Unquestionably a common
carrier is always entitled to a reasonable compensation
for his services. Hence it follows that he is not re-
quired, to treat all those who patronize with absolute
equality. It is his privilege to charge less than a
fair compensation to one person, or to a class of per-
sons, and others cannot justly complain so long as he
carries on reisonable terms for them. Respecting pref-
erences in rates of compensation, his obligation is to
charge no more than a fair return in each particular
transaction, and, accept, as thus; restricted, he is free
to discriminate at pleasure. This is the equal justice
to all which the law exacts from the comnorn carrier in
his relations to the public." I will collect some of
the cases reported sustaining some of' the views as ex-
pressed heretofore. Fitchburg R.R. Co. v. Gage, 12 Gray
Mass. 393. Sarget v. B. &. L. R.R., 115 Mass. 422.
Evershed v. L.& N.V. R.R., Law Rep. 3 Queens Bench Div.
135.
Second proposition: As to rates charged different
shippers.
Discrimination in rates, if' fair and reasonable upon
grounds consistent with public policy, will be permitted.
Hersch v. N1vthern etc. R.R. Co., 74 Pa. St. 181. Ragan
v. Aiken, 9 Lea (Tenn.) 684. In that case the fair and
reasonable interests of the carrier are regarded and it
has been held that advantages might be secured to indiv-
iduals where it is made clearly to appear, that in enter-
only
ing into such agreements the compaty have the interests
of the proprietors and the legitimate increase of the
profits of the railway in view, and the consideration
given to the company in return for the advantages is ade-
quate, and the company are willing to offer the same fa-
cilities to all others upon the same terms.
Nicholson v. Great Western R.R. Co., 3 C.L.R. 366.
Where the reasonableness of' charges is in question,
the principle is not what profit it may be reasonable for
a company to make, but what is a reasonable charge to the
person who is charged. Hence the court will dissect the
reports and accounts, so as to see whether a company which
constructed its works at the risk attendant upon all such
outlays, and which is still subject to natural risks, is
receiving in its income yielding an alleged profit of
fifteen percent an unreasonable amount, but will only
consider the reasonableness of the charge to the patron.
Canada Southern R.R. Co. v. International Bridge Co., Law
Rep. 8 Appeal Cases 723.
The fact that a company is receiving a greater divi-
dend from its receipts than its charter allows, can not
be set up in a bill to restrain etc., filed by a com-
-plainant who suffered no greater injury than did the gen-
eral public arld who seeks relief from discrimination.
Cumberland Valley R.R. Co. V. Appeal, 62 Pa. St. 218.
The c-,rrier's obligation to treat all shippers alike
does not forbid contracts for transportation at a less
rate in special cases where, under the circumstances, the
discrimination appears to be reasonable. The jury
should judge under the evidence, whether the preference
given was a f'air and reasonable one.
Houston and Texas Central R.R. Co. V. Rust, 58 Tex. 98.
I difference in cost to the carrier makes a differ-
ence in circumstances. It has been held thatto entitle
one to recover for discrimination in rates for the carri-
age of goods it must appeat that the discrimination was
mate for a like service and under like conditions in all
material respects; and the burden of proof is upon the
plaintif" claiming damages under such statutes for such
that
discrimination, to show the conditions of' the shipments
were like. Paxton v. Illinois etc. R.R. Co., 6 Am. and
Eng. R.R. Cases 591.
The carrier's charges may vary with the difference
in size, weight, and value of the goods consigned. It
is customary to regul;,te this difference by a classifi-
cation of goods and the fixing of the same freight for
all goods oi' the same class.
Lotspeich v. R.B. Co. of Georgia, 73 Ala. 306.
Broughton etc. Co. V. Grt. West. R.R. Co., 3 Am. and
Eng. R.R. cases, 645.
Pyle v. East Tenn. R.R. Co., 32 Am. and Eng. R.R. Cases
584.
Reynolds v. West. N.Y. Co., I Interstate Com. Rep. (Off)
393.
Farror v. East Tenn. etc. R.R. Co., 1 Interstate CorA. Rep
(Off ) 480.
Barkholder v. Union Trust Co., 82 No. 572.
Hulbe't v. Lake Shore & Mich. Southern Co., 34 Am. and
Eng. R.R. Cases 596.
Martin v. SouthernPac. R.R. Co., 2 Interstate Com. Rep. 1
A railroad company is not bound to carry large and
small quantities of' the same kind of merchandise between
the same points for the same price.
Concord &. Portsmouth R.R. Co. v. Forsyth, 59 N.H. 122
Transportation in large and in small quantities does
not cause the same amount of trouble and expense; thus
full train loads on large trucks warrant a reduction in
rates below those for light loads on small trucks.
Richardson v. Midland R.R. Co., 4 Nev. and Mac. 7.
The charge of a railroad company for transporting
packed parcels of' the frull sum which would be payable in
the aggregate it' they were not packed and were charged
for separately, can not be rightfully imposed upon the
public generally, or upon express companies or other mid-
dlemen.
C;anblos v. Pa. R.R. Co., 4 Brewester (Pa.) 536.
It is not a ground of' complaint against the railroad
company that it equalizes its rates as between small and
large towns, even though the ef'ect may be prejudicial to
the large town, which before had been spedially favored.
Crew v. the Richmond etc. R.R. Co., 32 Am. and Eng. R.R.
Cases, 596.
The relative reasonableness of' rates between locali-
ties can not be determined by any standard of' comparison,
but all the circumstances arA conditions that affect the
traffic must be considered; such as the length and char-
acter of' the haul, the cost of the service, the volume of
business, the conditions of' competition, the storage ca-
pacity, and the geographical situation at the different
terminal points, and numerous other matters.
Boston Chamb. of' Com. v. Lake Shore etc. R.R. Co., 32 AM.
and Eng. R.R. Cases 618.
It is a custom of carriers originating perhaps in
their own convenience, to group the towns of a consider-
able district, and to charge the sane rate to all within
the district. This custom has been commended, and it
has been held that it does not necessarily constitute
discrimination.
La'rosse 14anfrs. etc. Union v. Chicago etc. R.R. Co., 1
Interstate Com. Rep. 629.
The fact that the rates of the railroad company are
not established on a flileage basis does not necessarily
make out illegality or injustice.
Discrimination may be practiced in reflising to a
consignor an opportunity to ship a full car load of mixed
goods.
Martin v. Southern Pac. R.R. supra.
It would appear that an increase of speed and acco-
modations would justify an increase of charge.
City of Diblin Steam Packel Co, v. London etc. R.R. Co.,
4 R.R. and Canal Trans. Cases 10.
The fact that the cars used in traffic to a certain
locality are assured of a return load may justify an in-
crease of freight.
Girarpot V. Midland R.R. Co., 4 R.R. and Canal Trans.
Cases, 291.
As may also perhaps, the fact that the cars are of
a peculiar construction and only available tar live stock
Burton Stock Car Co. v. Chicago etc. R.R., 1 Interstate
Com. Rep. (Off) 132.
But the carrier can not justify higher rates for
hauling improved stock cars because more valuable live
stock is transported.
See same case.
The End.
